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Introduction 
Less than two weeks after the closing of the 2010 Shanghai Expo, Asians shifted their 
gaze to mainland China, this time, the opening of the 2010 Asian Games in Guangzhou. 
This was the second Asian Games to be held in mainland China, the first one being the 
1990 Beijing Asian Games. The 2010 Asian Games in Guangzhou, the capital of 
Guangdong province, was a more regional event than the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games 
or the 2010 Shanghai Expo. Nevertheless, the Guangzhou Asian Games provided an 
opportunity for the host city, and by extension the Guangdong province, to attain added 
global reputation and to strengthen its position in the Asia-Pacific regional economy. 
Guangzhou’s hosting of the Asian Games also exhibited a unique trait of China’s 
localism, albeit negotiated with the central state (Shin, 2014). Since the late 1970s, 
China’s local states had been given greater power during the period of economic 
decentralization in terms of expanding their grip on territorial economic activities. Local 
states also exhibited a certain degree of state entrepreneurialism to maximize economic 
gains through an active use of state agencies (Duckett, 2001; Wu and Phelps, 2011). The 
rise of local autonomy, however, was achieved under the auspices of the Party State that 
ensured the political centralization to bring about national security, territorial integrity 
and sociopolitical stability. 
On the day of the closing ceremony of the Guangzhou Asian Games, the Games flag 
changed hands, ultimately reaching the then mayor of Incheon, the city that was the 
next host of the Games taking place four years later. The 2014 Incheon Asian Games 
was the third Asian Games for South Korea: Seoul, the national capital, had it in 1986 
and Busan, the second largest city of the country, in 2002. Previously, Incheon fell from 
grace when it had to give up the host city status for the 1997 National Games due to 
poor preparations. The 2014 Asian Games was a chance to erase the dishonour. For 
Incheon, the 2014 Asian Games would also have been a means to revitalize its sluggish 
economy. Incheon developed rapidly as one of the major industrial centres during the 
country’s rapid economic development guided by the developmental state. About one-
third of Incheon’s gross regional product is still generated by the secondary industry 
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(e.g. manufacturing, mining, etc.), but the city's economy has been trailing behind 
Busan and had been recently overtaken by Ulsan. From the early 1990s, South Korea 
implemented a number of measures to liberalize its economy and also to promote 
decentralization (Pirie, 2008). Local elections were also adopted to allow the direct 
election of mayors and provincial governors, but there is a strong presence of the central 
state, a legacy of the developmental statism. Nevertheless, enhanced local autonomy 
provided the foundation of a prominent rise of regionalism and place-based growth 
politics. State entrepreneurialism, one of the key characteristics of the South Korean 
developmental state, has become a more distinctive characteristic of South Korean local 
states, when the central state itself was going through mutations vis-a-vis neoliberal 
pressures (Park et al., 2011). 
In this regard, the two Asian Games were embedded in political economic contexts that 
showed both similarities and differences. Notable differences arose given the 
domination of the Party State in mainland China (Liew 2005), on the one hand, and the 
mutations of the South Korean developmental state on the other hand (Park et al. 2012). 
Yet, the experiences of hosting the Asian Games by Guangzhou and Incheon also 
testified to the importance of local states proactively pursuing economic development 
through an active mobilization of resources to make productive investments. By 
juxtaposing the experiences of Guangzhou and Incheon in their preparation for the 
Asian Games, this chapter aims to show how both cities attempted, sometimes 
successfully and at other times unsuccessfully, to make use of the Asian Games to 
realise their developmental aspirations by investing heavily in the built environment. 
These attempts included fast-tracking the development process by launching ambitious 
mega-projects as part of channeling capital into the secondary circuit of the built 
environment (Harvey, 1978; see also Shin, 2012). As the chapter shows, these efforts 
were unfortunately speculative and debt-driven, placing a heavy burden on each city’s 
future developmental prospects. 
Local State Entrepreneurialism and Urban Development 
Developmental statism has been associated with the rise of Asian tiger economies such 
as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong in the 20th century (Castells, 1992) 
under conditions that were influenced not only by the domestic politics dominated by 
authoritarian states but also by the prevailing geopolitical economy such as the Cold 
War and armed struggles in the region (Glassman and Choi, 2014). Entrepreneurialism 
underpins developmental statism, which is characterised by the state’s active 
intervention in the economy to maximize capital accumulation. State institutions 
worked hand in hand with private business interests to excavate new business 
opportunities. Public corporations were often set up to assume the risk of venturing out 
into a new industrial sector or to address collective consumption (e.g. housing). A 
developmental state was not only a market regulator but also an active entrepreneurial 
participant in the market.  
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In times of democratisation and liberalization, such as the rise of local elections as 
witnessed in South Korea from the 1990s, local states tend to exhibit a more acute 
entrepreneurial orientation, as local politicians running for elections espouse place-
based interests to appeal to their constituencies. As cross-border activities and the 
influence of transnational capital grow, entrepreneurial local states at the municipal 
level may adopt ‘glurbanisation’ strategies “to secure the most advantageous insertion 
of a given city into the changing interscalar division of labour in the world 
economy” (Jessop and Sum, 2000, p.2295). Growth politics thus prevail, but this has 
inherent limitations when the local coffer is heavily dependent on central government 
subsidies (see Cochrane et al., 1996). 
In mainland China, the initiation of market reform has resulted in the transformation of 
the central and local states in the way they relate to the economy and the society. 
Restructuring of the state and its rescaling through decentralization provided local states 
with a stronger grip on territorial economies, gradually overcoming (though not 
diminishing entirely) the constraints of the vertical hierarchy of work-units inherited 
from the planned economy era. Earlier discussions of how the nature of the local state 
transformed during the reform era resulted in several studies that highlighted both the 
developmental and entrepreneurial roles of the local state. For instance, Jean Oi (1992, 
1995) examined the rise of township and village enterprises and their integration in the 
county-level economy in Shandong and Tianjin, arguing that local county governments 
displayed local state corporatism treating “enterprises within their administrative 
purview as one component of a large corporate whole” (Oi, 1995, p.1132). Local 
governments showed both entrepreneurial and governmental roles, transforming into 
“economic actors, not just administrative-service providers” (Oi 1995, p.1137; original 
emphasis). As economic actors, local states exercised entrepreneurship, taking risks and 
absorbing benefits, which then led to the rise of “a corporatist strategy to pool resources 
and debt” (Oi, 1995, p.1140). Duckett (1996, 2001) referred to state entrepreneurialism 
to examine the business-oriented activities of municipal departments of Tianjin, 
discussing how the state administrative bureaucracy adjusted to market-reform policies. 
Her main focus was on the establishment of new enterprises by state bureaux, and how 
these enterprises retained bureau personnel and governmental functions, essentially 
paving the way for ‘bureaucrats in business’ (Duckett, 2001). 
The entrepreneurial nature of China’s local states has become more pronounced due to 
their strong growth imperatives, which relied heavily on spatial strategies implemented 
by local states to drive ‘productive investment’ in the secondary circuit of capitalist 
accumulation; that is, investment in fixed assets and collective consumption. While the 
local state’s financial capacity got somewhat restricted when the central Chinese state 
promulgated tax reform in 1994, local governments were given the power to administer 
the transaction of land-use rights from the state (as the ultimate owner of urban land) to 
end-users such as developers. This provided the basis for local states becoming de facto 
landlords in the emerging land (use right) market (Shin, 2009), and for their 
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accumulation of land-related income as part of extra-budgetary revenues that contribute 
heavily to financing local development (see Lin et al., 2014 and Hsing 2010).  
These processes in turn laid the foundation for the exercise of entrepreneurial urban and 
regional policies by local states to expand their land assets. Development zones were set 
up as zones of exception across the country by local states, prompting Wu and Phelps 
(2011, p.427) to argue that “[t]he political economy of Chinese municipal 
entrepreneurialism has, on the whole, been altogether more complete in terms of the 
state’s control of the land-development process, the supporting infrastructure, and, as a 
consequence, the location of that growth”. You-tien Hsing (2010) discusses how urban 
governments have concentrated their resources on establishing ‘new towns’ (xincheng). 
The latter is identified as being promoted under the banner of “urban operation and 
management” (or chengshi yunying), which involves developers as key partners of 
urban development and aims at producing “property values” through following “the 
logic of the real-estate market” (2010, p.104). 
It is in this context of local state entrepreneurialism that this chapter comparatively 
discusses the experiences of pursuing mega-event hosting by major regional cities such 
as Guangzhou and Incheon. The existing literature has shown that mega-event hosting 
tends to be favoured by growth advocates (i.e. businesses, politicians or their joint 
coalition) as a means to address wider developmental agendas that include not only the 
attraction of investment capital and experts but also a local state’s productive 
investment in fixed assets. Some projects may get a green light to be fast-tracked (e.g. 
transportation projects or urban beautification), while some other projects may be 
pursued “even if they have little relevance to a sporting event” (Burbank et al, 2001, p.
29). The fact that local states pursue economic development in an entrepreneurial way 
does not necessarily mean that they would only target transnational capital for its 
inward investment. To a varying degree, local states are dependent fiscally on the 
central state, and this characteristic is more pronounced in times of mega-event hosting 
when the local state usually enters into negotiation with the central state to leverage as 
many national resources as possible (Cochrane, 1996).  
Major events such as the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup also make it 
compulsory for the central government to pledge a certain level of financial input into 
the Games preparation in order to make sure financing responsibility is apportioned 
between the host city and the central government, although the actual share of the 
central government contribution is up to further negotiation. In summary, mega-events 
are regarded as attractive strategies by both central and local states for their pursuit of 
political and economic interests. For local states that are relatively freed from the 
central state’s key concern for national security, territorial integrity and sociopolitical 
stability, their entrepreneurial characteristics would be even more pronounced when it 
comes to the use of mega-events to advance their development aspiration.  
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Spatial Manifestation of Regional Developmental Aspirations 
Event promoters in Guangzhou and Incheon saw the use of the Asian Games as a means 
to facilitate spatial restructuring and make productive investment in the built 
environment to accumulate fixed capital. For Guangzhou, the city’s development vision 
evolved throughout the 1990s to aspire to become an international central city in the 
Asia-Pacific region (see Xu and Yeh 2003: 365-368). This places Guangzhou, and by 
extension Guangdong Province in direct competition with neighbouring economies such 
as South Korea and Taiwan. In fact, Guangdong’s economy has already overtaken those 
of Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong in terms of the gross regional product. It is 
catching up fast with that of South Korea. The gross regional product of Guangdong 
was a little less than two-thirds of that of South Korea in 2010, but reached about three-
quarters three years later. Guangzhou’s gross regional product in 2010 was three times 
larger than that of Incheon.  
The Guangzhou municipal government produced an important strategic development 
plan in 2000. However, in 2004, soon after having successfully bid for the 2010 Asian 
Games, the municipal government announced a revised plan known as the Outline of 
Urban Planning and Construction for Guangzhou’s 2010 Asian Games. The 2004 plan 
also facilitated the development of the Pearl River New Town along its new central axis 
that is identified as the site for the city’s new central business district (CBD), as well as 
other new towns across the city to serve as new regional cores (see Shin 2014). The 
construction of this brand new CBD was a municipal effort that has spanned nearly two 
decades, and the Asian Games turned out to be a significant facilitator for its 
completion. Guangzhou’s keen interest to promote the new CBD was expressed in the 
city’s decision to have the Asian Games’ opening ceremony outside the main stadium 
on Haixisnha Island, positioned along the Pearl River at the southern end of the new 
CBD (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: The venue of the opening ceremony with the brand new Guangzhou Tower in 
the background (top) and the view of the new CBD (bottom) (Photographed by the 
author in 2011)  
Furthermore, domestically, Guangzhou’s use of the 2010 Asian Games and related 
developmental activities could be understood as the rise of the Pearl River Delta region, 
often dubbed as the ‘factory of the world’, in its competition with other city-regions 
such as the Beijing-Tianjin city-region and the Yangtze River Delta city-region. The 
need to direct national resources more towards the Pearl River Delta city-region was 
further justified by deploying a unique set of ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ discourses, 
framing the development of the Guangdong province simultaneously as advanced (in 
comparison with its own past and other regions) and lagged (in comparison with what it 
should be) (see Cartier 2012). Such a strategy also provides the rationale for a strenuous 
negotiation with the central Chinese state to consolidate Guangzhou’s leadership 
position within the Pearl River Delta city-region vis-a-vis Shenzhen and neighbouring 
special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau (Shin 2014; Cheung 2012). 
This was particularly pronounced in the 2008 Outline of the Plan for the Reform and 
Development of the Pearl River Delta region (hereafter 2008 Outline), produced by the 
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National Development and Reform Commission in consultation with the provincial 
government four years after Guangzhou won the host city status of the 2010 Asian 
Games. It is noteworthy to state that all these efforts especially at the provincial level 
were under the leadership of influential political figures who rose to prominent 
positions in the vertical hierarchy of the Chinese Party State: the Party Secretary of the 
province, the top political figure, was Dejiang Zhang between 2002 and 2007, 
succeeded by Yang Wang between 2007 and 2012, both of whom were promoted to 
become one of the vice-premiers in the central government. 
In line with a number of development projects to transform the city, the Guangzhou 
municipal government further established its ambitious plan to promote city-wide urban 
redevelopment projects. The municipality was already showing keen interests in 
transforming its city-scape by tackling a large number of ‘dilapidated’ housing stocks, 
as one of the media reports suggested: 
“According to the Guangzhou Land and Housing Management Bureau, the total 
registered size of dilapidated housing in Guangzhou reached 911,000 square metres by 
the end of 2004. In 2005, another 57,000 square metres were newly added to this...The 
Guangzhou municipal government decided that these dilapidated houses will be the key 
to the city’s old city redevelopment works in the coming years. It was also put forward 
that the redevelopment of dilapidated houses in the city was to be completed before the 
2010 Asian Games” (Huang, 2007). 
The new ambitious plan to redevelop the city targeted in particular what the 
municipality defined as the “Three Olds”, that is, old inner-city neighbourhoods, old 
brownfield sites and old urbanised villages. The urban redevelopment policy was 
initially advocated and announced by the provincial government of Guangdong in 2009, 
and put into practice in Guangzhou in the same year. A special bureau was opened in 
February 2010 to oversee the progress and supervise municipal-wide “Three Olds” 
projects, helping the government to implement so-called “environmental improvement” 
projects that covered 318 square kilometres. More than one-third of the target areas was 
to go through wholesale demolition and reconstruction over the next 10 years or so 
(Nanfang Daily, 2010). A number of redevelopment projects were streamlined to be 
completed in time for the opening of the 2010 Asian Games. For instance, a planning 
official in one of the old city districts in Guangzhou, indicated that the district 
government received about 0.22 billion yuan from the municipal government for the 
city’s Games-related environmental improvement projects, and another 0.38 billion 
yuan for the waterside renovation along the creeks in the district, all to be completed 
before the Asian Games (interviewed on 17 September 2009).  1
In the case of Incheon, the initiative to strengthen investment in the built environment 
was led by its mayors directly elected in local elections since 1995. The two mayors 
who were influential in urban politics in the city and who reigned successively until 
2010 were all from the right-wing political party, which ruled South Korea for most of 
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its industrialisation period until the 1990s. These mayors advocated urban policies that 
emphasized state-led development. They aspired to expand the capacity of the 
municipality to design and implement a number of real estate and infrastructure 
projects, which were centred on accumulating land assets through reclamation as a 
means to secure revenue sources (Shin forthcoming). Although an opposition party 
candidate with a more liberal stance took the mayoral seat for the first time in 2010, the 
boosterish policies begun under the previous mayors were difficult to overturn,, 
including preparation works for the Asian Games that had fixed and irreversible 
deadlines, 
In Korea, Incheon’s primary concern was to come out of the shadow of the economic 
and political influence of neighbouring Seoul, the national capital city, and to transform 
its earlier reputation as a manufacturing centre  into a city of high-tech and international 2
business. Incheon’s gross regional product (at current prices) was only about one-fifth 
of that of Seoul (Incheon Metropolitan Government 2014a). For Incheon, its 
developmental aspiration was embedded not only in the context of declining economic 
position of the city within South Korea, but also in the context of its regional future 
threatened by rapidly developing China across the sea. Bidding for the Asian Games 
therefore reflected Incheon’s enthusiasm “to help elevate South Korea's third largest city 
onto the world map as a new economic hub of Northeast Asia” (Kositchotethana 2007). 
Similar to Guangzhou’s desire to build the Pearl River New Town as the city’s new 
CBD, Incheon also aimed to build an international centre of business and finance, 
focused on the use of reclaimed land adjacent to South Korea’s international gateway, 
the Incheon International Airport. This ambition emerged back in the early 2000s when 
Shanghai, only about two hours away by flight from Incheon, was seeing the initial 
completion of the development of Pudong (Chen 2007). The ambition was also closely 
entwined with the then national policy to promote the country as a Northeast Asian 
business hub centred on high-tech and global service industries including finance and 
logistics (Shin forthcoming). This ambition resulted in the designation of the new 
Incheon Free Economic Zone (IFEZ) as a zone of exception in August 2003, aimed “to 
attract investments and offer world class business environment that guarantees high 
returns for investors” (Ghawi 2007). Bolstered by this, the then mayor Sang-Soo Ahn, 
who got elected in 2002, propagated a successful bid in 2007 for the 2014 Summer 
Asian Games. As the section chief in urban design at the metropolitan government says: 
“the previous mayor wanted to promote Incheon as an urban brand globally, and the 
sporting mega-event was combined with the IFEZ… By having the Asian Games, 
Incheon would be known to the Asian population, raise its position in the region, and 
attract the attention from emerging economies including China and encourage their 
investment” (interviewed on 12 December 2011). 
Moreover, at the time of running for re-election in 2006, Ahn made 100 key election 
pledges out of which 90 were urban and regional development projects that centred on 
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mega-scale real estate projects. These were mostly to redevelop existing historic urban 
cores, and to develop new towns, as well as to concentrate resources on the IFEZ and 
the Asian Games-related facilities (Lee 2010: 73-74). Revenues from selling reclaimed 
land to investors and developers were meant to pay for subsequent infrastructure 
development as well as state-led redevelopment in existing urban cores. 
The Asian Games and other development projects were all streamlined to raise the 
international profile of Incheon and, in return, attract further investment. The seeds were 
initially sown in the establishment of the 2020 Incheon Urban Master Plan, which 
received the final approval in May 2006 by the Ministry of Construction and Transport 
at the central government. The preparation of the 2020 Urban Master Plan was given a 
full thrust under the leadership of mayor Sang-Soo Ahn, who started serving his first 
four-year term from July 2002. At the time of preparing the 2020 Urban Master Plan, 
Incheon was already proposing an ambitious plan to increase the total metropolitan 
population from 2.62 million people in 2005 to 3.5 million by 2020.  
This was downsized by the Central Urban Planning Committee of the Ministry of 
Construction and Transport during the approval process. However, only two years after 
the approval of the 2020 Urban Master Plan, a new proposal was put forward by the 
Incheon metropolitan government to revise the previous plan and prepare a 2025 Urban 
Master Plan. Led again by mayor Sang-Soo Ahn, who successfully ran for his second 
term in the 2006 local election, the metropolitan government argued that the revision 
was necessary as Incheon was awarded in April 2007 the right to host the 2014 Summer 
Asian Games. The proposal for the 2025 Urban Master Plan put forward for public 
consultation was even more ambitious, setting the planned size of the total municipal 
population to reach 4 million (Lee 2010, p.89; Incheon Metropolitan Government 
2009). About 1.2 million people were meant to be migrating from outside Incheon by 
2025, to be accommodated by various development projects envisaged in the proposal 
for a new master plan. 
All these were put together to promote Incheon globally and place the city on the global 
investor’s map, helping it to achieve its openly pronounced aspiration to become 
(somewhat over-ambitiously) one of the world’s top ten cities. These objectives were to 
be assisted by “mega-scale development projects, changes to the transportation system, 
and urban redevelopment projects for a balanced development of existing urban 
areas” (Incheon Metropolitan Government 2009, p.2). Incheon also organised a World 
Urban Fair (officially named later on as the Global Fair & Festival) in 2009. The 
aforementioned IFEZ constituted one of the major growth poles for Incheon and itself 
became a major mega-project for the metropolitan government’s drive to transform 
Incheon into a city of multiple centralities and global prominence. The IFEZ was given 
multiple roles, destined to become sites for international business and finance, high-tech 
knowledge industry, culture, tourism, leisure, transportation hub centred on the existing 
international airport, and upmarket residential estates. The IFEZ alone was planned to 
accommodate 0.9 million new residents (ibid, p.23). To showcase the newly emerging 
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IFEZ, the Asian Games also saw the allocation of some of the strategic events, such as 
triathlon and beach volleyball, to the Songdo Free Economic Zone, an epicentre of 
Incheon’s aspiration to become a regional centre in the East Asian region (see Shin 
forthcoming on Songdo City development). New development areas, such as the 
Songdo International Business District saw the accommodation of and the opening of 
the Games’ media centre.  3
Debt-driven Speculative Development 
During the years of preparing for the Asian Games, the developmental aspiration held 
by the governments of Guangzhou and Incheon translated into various urban 
redevelopment, beautification and infrastructure projects. These projects naturally 
required the mobilization of large financial resources, eventually placing a heavy 
burden on local government. The Guangzhou and Incheon governments dealt with the 
financial situation in differing ways, reflecting the divergences by which urban political 
economy was structuring state actions despite their differentiated modes of establishing 
state entrepreneurialism. However, the common thread was the fact that these projects 
were largely speculative and debt-driven. 
In the case of Guangzhou, the city’s Games-related finance showed some similarities 
with the way in which Beijing spent its money for the 2008 Olympic Games (Shin, 
2009b). That is, much more money was spent on infrastructure provision and 
beautification. As an expert at the Guangzhou Asian Games Organizing Committee 
pointed out (interviewed on 16 September 2009), as far as the Asian Games were 
concerned, the public facilities that received the greatest emphasis would have been “the 
transport, which is definitely the most important”. An earlier report suggested that about 
122.6 billion yuan was spent on the Asian Games and the related urban projects (see 
Shin 2012). About 90% of the total expenditure were thought to have gone into 
infrastructure and urban redevelopment projects, while the remaining 10% were to pay 
for the Games operation costs. The suggested total amount of spending by Guangzhou 
for the Games preparation was larger than the total annual budget of Guangzhou in 2011 
(103.8 billion yuan) (Qiu 2011). An academic with frequent experiences of providing 
policy consultation services for the municipal government suggests in an interview with 
the author that the Guangzhou Asian Games came as a huge opportunity to make things 
possible in a shortened amount of time: 
“Actually, I think direct organising is not too much money, but the 
infrastructure change or construction is an opportunity for the city, so they 
take this opportunity. and, also they always use this word ‘to take the 
opportunity from the event’, because the economic, the industrial 
development and planning is also based on this. And, also the urban 
planning is based on this... They consider money as not quite a 
problem” (interviewed on 16 September 2009) 
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In particular, local government finance is heavily dependent on land-related revenues 
generated by selling land use rights as part of expanding extra-budgetary revenues that 
have become a major source of local finance since the 1994 Tax Reform (Lin et al. 
2014). In Guangzhou, the debt issue was also raised but it is not clear what impact this 
may have on municipal development, as most developmental projects in China had in 
fact been debt-driven and speculative, in particular by means of using state investment 
companies often known as local government finance vehicles or LGFVs to issue bonds 
or borrow from financial institutions on behalf of local governments. In the case of local 
states in mainland China, concerns were raised about the possibility of a large amount 
of local debts incurred by local government finance vehicles (LGFVs); that is, public 
enterprises set up by local governments to issue bonds or borrow loans. It is reported 
that the total amount of borrowing by LGFVs across the country totalled 17.89 trillion 
yuan that would amount to about one third of China’s GDP (Anderlini 2014; Sweeney 
2014). 
While the debt situation was not rising prominently at the time of Asian Games 
preparation, it became a concern about two years later. For instance, a deputy with the 
Guangzhou People’s Congress named Nanshan Zhong accused the municipal 
government for having invested far too much on the Games preparation, and claimed 
that after the Games, the city was left with a huge debt that reached 210 billion yuan 
(Qiu 2011). His claim was quickly rebuked by the director of the city’s finance bureau, 
questioning the source of such figures. However, at the end of December 2012, 
Guangzhou revealed that its excessive debt level reached 241.4 billion yuan by mid-
year 2012 (Yang 2012). This is about 233% of Guangzhou’s budget for government 
expenditure for the year 2011 (103.8 billion yuan) (Zhang 2011), which may sound an 
alarm bell for many observers. On 30 July 2013, Guangzhou further revealed that “it 
needs to pay loans worth almost 26.1 billion yuan this year. That is 19.37 percent of the 
city government’s projected income for this year” (Wang 2013).   
Similar concerns about Incheon’s financial health were raised by some council 
members, but at the time of Incheon’s bid these concerns were not extended to the Asian 
Games. The whole city celebrated the award of the Games when Incheon comfortably 
defeated Delhi in Kuwait in April 2007. On 28 June 2011, a ground-breaking ceremony 
was held in Incheon for the construction of the main Games stadium (see Figure 2). 
This however accompanied increasing awareness of  the host city’s shaky finances. 
Incheon’s mounting debt was the main source of contention in the 2010 local election, 
which saw the defeat of mayor Sang-Soo Ahn by the opposition party candidate Young-
Gil Song, whose election pledges included the reduction of metropolitan debt, including 
a reduction in expenditures for the Asian Games. He even considered giving up the 
Asian Games altogether, although this turned out to be damaging for his political 
reputation. An alternative plan was to refurbish an existing stadium (which had been 
incurring operational losses at the time) instead of building the brand new one originally 
pledged by the previous mayor. However, the news of cancelling the construction of a 
new stadium provoked severe complaints from those residents and businesses who had 
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vested interests in the proposed new site and mayor Song gave in and agreed to resume 
the construction of a new stadium. 
Figure 2: Main stadium for the Incheon Asian Games (photographed by the author in 
2014) 
Over the years, Incheon’s financial situation had been aggravated as the metropolitan 
government’s drive to realise its growth ambition was put into high gear. The city’s debt 
level, known to be manageable until the mid-2000s, rose rapidly, largely due to the 
promotion of mega-projects and the preparation for the 2014 Asian Games (Kim 2012). 
While the total amount of municipal bonds issued was 1.41 trillion Korean Won by the 
end of 2007, it soared to reach 2.33 trillion Korean Won in 2009, and then 3.26 trillion 
Korean Won in 2014 (Kim 2012: 262; Incheon Metropolitan Government 2015).  4
Accordingly, the ratio of total municipal debts to the annual budget also surged over the 
years, recording 26.9% in 2007, 29.8% in 2009 and 37.5% in 2014, dangerously 
approaching the 40% ceiling, a threshold defined by the Local Finance Act to identify 
local government’s fiscal crisis (ibid). Out of the 3.26 trillion Korean Won of municipal 
debts by the end of 2014, nearly one-third (31.8%) resulted from the bonds issued to 
finance the construction of the Asian Games facilities (see Table 1 below). The direct 
costs of the Asian Games preparation related to the Games facilities were effectively 
debt-financed (Kim 2011: 59-60). 
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Another 5% (121 billion Korean Won) of the total debts was due to the project to 
construct the second line of Incheon’s urban rail network. The project was originally 
scheduled for completion before the opening of the Asian Games to showcase Incheon’s 
public transportation. However, the project saw various delays and is now to be 
completed by mid-2016. According to a report provided by the Incheon Asian Games 
Organizing Committee in 2011 for the Incheon Metropolitan Council, the total costs of 
the Games preparation were expected to reach 2.74 trillion Korean Won, which would 
have been a little more than two-fifths of Incheon’s total annual budget in 2011. These 
included the costs of constructing Games facilities (1.90 trillion Korean Won) as well as 
the operational costs of the organising committee and other supporting offices. Of all 
the Games preparation costs, the metropolitan government was to undertake 71.9% 
while the central government was to cover only 19.4% of the total costs.  5
Table 1: Total Debts of Incheon Metropolitan Government 
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Incheon’s financial situation was further aggravated by its use of a municipal 
development corporation, Incheon Development & Tourism Corporation (hereafter 
IDTC), to pursue a number of infrastructure and real estate projects as set out in the 
Incheon Urban Master Plan. Although the debt incurred by the IDTC was kept separate 
from the aforementioned metropolitan debt, the Incheon metropolitan government was 
ultimately responsible for the accrual of debts by the IDTC. Financing the IDTC 
projects occurred through bond issues and reliance on project-financing, but this 
eventually placed a financial burden on the municipality. The total amount of financial 
debts owed by the IDTC increased from 401.3 billion Korean Won in 2006, and surged 
to 1.5 trillion in 2007, and 3.5 trillion in 2009. During the next four years, the financial 
debts doubled again, reaching 7.0 trillion Korean Won in 2013 (Incheon Metropolitan 
Government 2014b: 6). About 90% of all the financial debts as of the end of 2013 were 
from the metropolitan government’s real estate projects, especially centred on mega-
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projects such as the Yeongjong Sky City land development and the Geomdan new town 
development, located west and north of Incheon’s historic core respectively. These two 
mega-projects were designed to be new sub-centres of Incheon, aimed at contributing to 
the diversification and invigoration of Incheon’s economic activities and land use.  
However, the heavy upfront costs poured into the land assembly, as well as 
compensation for property owners in the process of land expropriation, meant that the 
IDTC had to bear a substantial degree of financial pressure. In particular, the land 
development of the Yeongjong Sky City site was accompanied by a lack of business 
interest in land purchase: the rate of land sales was only 24% -- far below the 
expectation of the metropolitan government, and therefore preventing it from recovering 
costs and raising profits that were meant to go into other development projects, 
especially the redevelopment of Incheon’s historic centre. The Geomdan new town 
development has also been substantially delayed since the announcement of 
compensation measures for existing property owners in October 2009. The financial 
debts incurred by these two mega-projects constituted about 56% of total financial debts 
as of the end of 2013 (Incheon Metropolitan Government 2014b: 7).   6
It is difficult to see how these grim situations may change in the near future. The 
designation of a number of inner-city redevelopment projects, in particular, were hit not 
only by the global financial crisis in 2007-8, but also by the emphasis on real estate 
projects in the IFEZ. As the section chief responsible for urban redevelopment in the 
Incheon metropolitan government says, “if inner-city redevelopment projects are to 
succeed, there should not be other new-build apartment projects nearby. Certainly, the 
new-build projects in the IFEZ and the Asian Games village has become hindrance to 
the inner-city redevelopment, as those are more sought after by buyers who are from 
Seoul or neighbouring province” (interviewed on 12 December 2011). 
Conclusion 
Once awarded, mega-events have their own momentum due to unavoidable deadlines 
and the host city’s ambition to showcase itself to global and domestic spectators. The 
need to stage a highly visible and recognizably impressive event, under time and budget 
constraints,  creates a sense of urgency, and induces a high level of concentrated 
investment in the built environment (e.g. Games facilities, transport infrastructure, 
beautification, etc.). As this chapter shows, mega-events are often embedded in larger 
plans to transform the built environment and promote the global reputation of the host 
city and country. In both Guangzhou and Incheon, the preparation for the Asian Games 
was actively incorporated into their overall urban development plans. The two mega-
events reflect each host city’s ambition to achieve increased global visibility and 
prominence. In Guangzhou, the city was focused on consolidating its position as the 
“dragon head” in south China and, at the same time, rising to become an international 
regional centre. Incheon also aspired to become an international regional centre, aided 
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by its free economic zone and the international airport. Both cities witnessed a heavy 
emphasis on expanding the investment in the built environment in the form of 
promoting urban redevelopment, new town construction, infrastructure provision and so 
on. 
Incheon’s local state entrepreneurialism was evident in its promotion of various 
boosterish projects that aimed at transforming the city-scape through real estate projects 
and infrastructure construction as well as the promotion of the central state-endorsed 
free economic zone, one of its first kinds in South Korea. As discussed elsewhere (see 
Shin forthcoming), Incheon made efforts to make use of land reclamation as a means to 
expand its land asset basis, which could then be sold to developers and other private 
businesses to raise revenues that would in turn be used to finance other imperative 
developmental projects. For Incheon, the promotion of a large number of development 
projects encompassing both infrastructure and real estate produced a deepening 
speculative urbanisation process, which was built on a dangerously high level of local 
debts incurred by both the metropolitan government and its public corporation. In 
essence, Incheon’s state entrepreneurialism was driven by debts. 
For Guangzhou, the event-led development proved to be useful in both times of 
inflationary expansion (when the central government actually cautioned excessive 
investment) and of recession, all of which characterised the economic climate during the 
Asian Games preparation period between 2005 and 2010. During the former 
inflationary period, while the central government warned local governments not to 
make excessive investments, the Asian Games preparation was an excuse for 
Guangzhou to justify further investments. In times of economic recession after the 
global financial crisis, the Asian Games preparation was also useful for Guangzhou to 
minimise, if not overcome, negative impacts of the crisis on the city and on the PRD 
region as a whole. Guangzhou also exhibited the usual ‘land-based accumulation’, 
which makes proactive use of land-related extra-budgetary revenue for financing fixed 
asset investments (Hsing 2010; Lin et al. 2014). This practice is built on the local state 
acting as a de facto landlord (Shin 2009), the power endowed in the local state by the 
central state-led reform to commodify land assets and let local states administer land 
(use right) transactions. The Guangzhou municipal government turned out to be 
excessively indebted, a shared feature in mainland China among local governments. 
Such indebted conditions have become a source of major concern more recently, as 
China’s economic growth is expected to slow down in comparison with previous years’ 
growth records. 
In conclusion, despite the apparent differences in the political economic structure of the 
two cities, the ways in which both Incheon and Guangzhou pursued their 
entrepreneurial state agenda present a lot of similarities, especially in terms of how the 
state-led investment in the built environment had been largely debt-driven in both cities, 
and how this process was facilitated by the mega-event preparation. Incheon’s high 
level of local debts resulting from issuing municipal bonds was a source of concern 
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especially during the final phase of its Games preparation. Guangzhou’s debt level also 
came to the attention of the general public more recently, raising doubts about the 
effectiveness of China's local governments’ unrestrained investment in fixed assets. 
Recently, the central state implemented a pilot scheme to allow key local governments 
such as Zhejiang, Guangdong, Shanghai and Shenzhen to experiment with the issuing of 
municipal bonds (Anderlini 2011). This was expanded in May 2014 to cover ten local 
governments: Shanghai, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Shenzhen, Jiangsu, Shandong, Beijing, 
Qingdao, Ningxia and Jiangxi. From September 2014, all local governments were given 
the go-ahead to issue bonds to finance their development without having to face 
restrictions as before (Sweeney 2014). The true effect of this new scheme is yet to be 
seen. While the scheme has been designed to allow local governments to find an 
alternative avenue of raising funds for development and depend less on land resources, 
it is highly possible that without diminishing development aspiration and GDPism, the 
practice of speculative and debt-driven development is likely to continue in the 
foreseeable future in China. 
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